Remembering the Past, Shaping the Future: Memory Frictions and Nation-Making in Timor-Leste by Kent, Lia
SSGM DISCUSSION PAPER 2015/1
Remembering the Past, Shaping the Future: 
Memory Frictions and Nation-Making in 
Timor-Leste
LIA KENT
State, Society & Governance in Melanesia  ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm
Introduction
Among policy-makers working in the field of 
peace-building, there is growing interest in how 
initiatives to memorialise or commemorate the 
violent past might contribute to peace. Monuments, 
memorials, museums and commemorative rituals 
are now conceptualised as a form of ‘symbolic 
reparations’ that will contribute to victims’ healing 
(see Hopwood 2011). It is argued, too, that these 
sites and practices will help to strengthen bonds 
between groups and individuals and so contribute to 
social cohesion (see Jelin 2007, 139). An underlying 
assumption is that preventing future conflict, 
promoting peaceful coexistence and constructing a 
new national identity depends upon remembering 
and developing a common narrative about past 
atrocities (see Ibreck 2013, 165; Hopwood 2011). 
Against this straightforward and linear narrative, 
recent social science studies of collective memory 
in post-conflict societies sound a note of caution. 
Their insights suggest that, although political leaders 
seek to produce and disseminate a sense of national 
consciousness through national memorial projects, 
these projects do not always unfold in the ways they 
are intended. Rather than producing an ‘agreed-to’ 
interpretation of the past, monuments and com-
memorative rituals may give rise to political strug-
gles around the meanings of what occurred and may 
themselves become key sites of such struggles. These 
struggles are not just about interpretations of history, 
but, because they concern the fundamental question 
of whose version of events will be recognised within 
the narratives of national identity, are intricately 
entwined with questions of power, legitimacy and 
recognition in the present. 
From this point of departure, this Discussion 
Paper examines the politics of remembering the 
24-year Indonesian occupation in post-conflict 
Timor-Leste. Specifically, I am interested in what 
memorialisation initiatives, and the debates that 
surround them, reveal about East Timorese expe-
riences and ‘imaginings’ of the nation. Following 
a brief overview of recent literature on collective 
memory, I describe how state-sponsored memorial-
isation and commemoration of the 24-year period 
of the Indonesian occupation is becoming increas-
ingly visible.1 While on the one hand this suggests 
the growing reach and increasing effectiveness, of 
the government’s efforts to draw people into a com-
mon national community, there are also tensions 
as different groups and individuals question which 
events are remembered and how, and the processes 
through which memorials are planned. A num-
ber of alternative, civil-society-led documentation 
and memorialisation initiatives are also emerging, 
which to some extent challenge state-driven priori-
ties and practices. I suggest that these dynamics, 
which illuminate the inherently frictional nature 
of memory politics, can be understood as part of 
the process of ‘nation-making’ — that is, the plural, 
contested and ongoing negotiation of national con-
sciousness by a range of different groups and actors 
(Foster 1997, 5). While the extent to which these 
efforts will help to foster a more inclusive concep-
tion of national identity remains to be seen, what 
seems clear is that the political leadership’s attempts 
to shape official memory are, paradoxically, pro-
viding an impetus for a diverse range of alternative 
memory practices and debates.
Collective Memory and the Nation 
While memory is often thought of as a function 
of individual cognition, scholarship on collective 
memory is in agreement that it is 
also socially produced, at least in 
part. In his still-influential analysis 
of collective memory, the sociolo-
gist Maurice Halbwachs helped to 
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show that individual memories operate in broader 
social and political frameworks; that it is within 
society that people ‘recall, recognise and localize 
their memories’ (Halbwachs 1992, 38). He dem-
onstrated, too, that collective memory is selectively 
constructed, that past events are always inter-
preted in the light of present-day preoccupations 
and interests (Olick et al. 2011, 18). As vehicles of 
memory, memorials and commemorative practices 
become part of the ‘symbolic landscape’ (Ross 2013, 
97), which helps to frame and communicate com-
mon narratives of shared events.
The relationship between memory sites and 
practices and the formation of national identity has 
been a particular focus of scholarly inquiry. Fol-
lowing Benedict Anderson, whose work powerfully 
highlighted the extent to which national commu-
nities are shaped by ‘imaginings’ that command 
the loyalty of citizens, scholars have observed how 
national narratives about the past act as ‘legitimat-
ing moments’ for new regimes (Norval 1998, 251), 
which help to preserve and reinforce dominant 
elites and ideologies (Ashplant et al. 2000, 8). They 
have described how, through acts of public remem-
brance, national elites seek to cultivate a shared 
understanding of the past in order to reinforce a 
sense of national identity, and, through this, their 
own legitimacy (Ibreck 2009, 330). These concerns 
are magnified in post-conflict societies where there 
is an acute need to give meaning to past experienc-
es of grief and loss, and imagine a collective future 
(Ibreck 2009; Selimovic 2013). In such contexts, 
commemorative rituals, memorials and monu-
ments ‘contribut[e] to illusions of stability and con-
tinuity and serv[e] as a glue to hold together com-
munities’ (Ibreck 2009, 12). They also help to legiti-
mise a new political order by signifying a definitive 
break between the past and present orders. 
Studies have also highlighted that the state does 
not have a monopoly on the politics of memory. 
While political elites will reinforce memories 
and identities that are essential to their own 
legitimacy  — and marginalise those that threaten 
to undermine it — official narratives do not always 
unfold as they are intended, and memory is under 
constant construction and reconstruction. Some 
studies have focused on the inherently ‘frictional’ 
nature of memory politics. The idea of ‘friction’ 
provides a useful conceptual lens to analyse 
the abrasive, sticky, and unequal ways in which 
different actors/agents, discourses and practices 
‘rub up against’ one another, and, in the process, 
produce new power relations, ideas and practices 
(Bjorkdahl and Hoglund 2013, 295).2 Memory 
frictions sometimes lead to, or result from, the 
emergence of alternative or ‘counter memories’. 
Counter memories are often produced by groups 
who perceive their version of the past to be 
marginalised within official discourse, and may, 
at times, be channelled into claims for symbolic 
recognition, political representation and financial 
compensation (Graves and Rechniewski 2010, 2; 
see also Olick and Robbins 1998.) Friction may also 
be evidence of tensions between the modernising, 
homogenising nation-building project of political 
elites and local identities, value systems and beliefs 
(see Grenfell 2012). 
This paper focuses principally on friction 
between ‘official’ and ‘local’ ways of remembering 
the past, while acknowledging that the distinction 
between official and local is itself not always clear 
cut. An examination of how political leaders and 
citizens differ in relation to goals, priorities and 
practices of remembering the past is important 
because this can reveal a great deal about peoples’ 
conceptions and experiences of the nation. For 
instance, it can shed light on which sections of soci-
ety perceive themselves to be excluded within the 
nation and how they seek to address this exclusion. 
It can also shed light on how conceptions of nation-
al (and local) identity are changing. To extend 
this point a little further, we might view memory 
frictions as part of what Robert Foster refers to 
as ‘nation-making’. In contrast to the concept of 
nation-building, which traditionally connotes the 
instrumental process through which a small minor-
ity of state officials and intellectuals self-consciously 
promote and disseminate national consciousness, 
Foster uses the term nation-making to describe 
the more organic, unruly and contested process 
through which the nation, as a narrative, is negoti-
ated by different agents with competing agendas 
in an ongoing way (Foster 2002, 5). Importantly, 
Foster’s conception of nation-making does not nec-
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essarily imply a ‘gradual acculturation of people to 
a set of shared, univocal systems’ but, rather, recog-
nises the various means through which the ‘nation 
enters the lives of ordinary people as a frame of 
reference for thinking and acting reflexively.’ (Fos-
ter 2002, 17–18). In other words, there are multiple, 
rather than singular, narratives of nation, and the 
nation is imagined as much by ordinary people as it 
is by political elites (Foster 2002, 5). 
A final, important theme that emerges in the 
collective memory scholarship is the centrality of 
the dead. It is impossible to speak of memorialising 
the past without reference to the war dead who, 
in the aftermath of conflict, are transformed by 
political elites into symbols of martyrdom and 
nationhood. As Kwon (2006, 176) observes, 
vast memorial projects were initiated in Europe 
following the First World War in the name of the 
‘common soldier’, which ‘were later replicated in 
the new postcolonial states of the Third World.’ 
These projects sought to transform the ‘universal 
experience of bereavement into a positive force to 
strengthen national unity’ (Kwon 2006, 176) by 
reframing death within a constructed, communal 
understanding of its significance (McEvoy and 
Conway 2004, 561). As Khalili describes, military 
and national cemeteries provide a focus for 
nationalist rituals, during which,
the state ‘captures’ its community’s lost sons 
and daughters and transforms their deaths 
into willing sacrifices for the nation; in the 
process, the state also appropriates private 
rituals of grief and mourning in the cause 
of national unification and ‘healing’ … it 
attempts to transform the suffering inher-
ent in mourning for the dead into a heroic 
national narrative where no death is wasted, 
and all death eventuates in the glory of a uni-
fied nation (Khalili 2005, 32).
A number of excellent ethnographic studies 
have offered detailed explorations of the ways the 
dead are utilised by political elites during formative 
periods of nation-building.3 A particularly 
fascinating example is Heonik Kwon’s (2006) study 
of commemoration in Vietnam, which examines 
how the postwar state hierarchy of Vietnam has 
promoted the worship of the heroic war dead as 
symbols of ‘the nation’s unity and for its prosperous 
and enlightened future’. In this process, the 
‘unmarked graves that held the entangled bodies 
of village women and children’ who died in the 
My Lai and Ha My massacres, and ‘who were not 
a desirable object in this postwar construction 
of national memory’ have been ignored (Kwon 
2006, 2). Kwon’s study also highlights how, within 
these constraints, local villagers have begun to 
explore their own ways of remembering the dead. 
These local efforts have worked against the state’s 
attempts to ‘consolidate and contain’ the meaning of 
sacrifice and classify dead bodies into ‘civilian’ and 
‘soldier’ (Truitt 2008, 259). As we shall see, similar 
struggles over the ownership of the dead — what 
they represent, how they should be dealt with, and 
by whom — are ongoing in Timor-Leste. Local 
involvement in state-sponsored reburial practices 
may also be subtly widening the parameters of who 
can be considered funu nain (heroes).
State-Sponsored Memorialisation and 
Commemoration 
As is now well established, between 100,000 and 
200,000 East Timorese lost their lives during the 
oppressive 24-year Indonesian occupation of the 
territory, from 1974–1999 (CAVR 2005). Some died 
as a direct result of military attacks (among them, 
members of Timor-Leste’s tenacious resistance 
movement), while others died due to starvation and 
illness. Since Timor-Leste became independent in 
2002, state-sponsored memorialisation and com-
memoration of this period of history has become 
increasingly visible. Since early 2014, international 
visitors arriving in the nation’s capital, Dili, have 
been greeted with a glimpse of an imposing statue of 
Nicolau Lobato, one of the nation’s founding fathers 
and military resistance leader, who was killed by the 
elite Indonesian commando force Kopassus in the 
early years of the occupation. The statue stands near 
the international airport (also named in Lobato’s 
honour), at the intersection of the airport road with 
the main Comoro road into Dili. Lobato is repre-
sented in military fatigues, holding the Timor-Leste 
national flag in one hand and a gun in the other, his 
gaze directed at the nation’s capital. 
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Other state-sponsored commemorative projects 
include the monument erected in 2013 outside the 
Motael chuch to commemorate the hundreds of 
mostly young people who died during the Santa 
Cruz massacre (or Dili massacre) that occurred at 
the Santa Cruz Cemetery in Dili on 12 November 
1991.4 This monument, which depicts an image 
of a young man cradling his injured and bleeding 
friend, is a copy of an image that was made famous 
by the video footage of the massacre taken by jour-
nalist Max Stahl, which was smuggled out of the 
country and broadcast to the world. 
Another prominent initiative is the ‘Garden of 
Heroes’ cemetery in Metinaro, where the remains of 
FALINTIL5 fighters are now buried. The gravesites 
are generic and uniform in character, constructing 
a narrative of the ‘common soldier’ that attempts to 
bring the dead into connection with one another 
due to their deaths for the nation’s liberation. As 
Damian Grenfell observes:
The gravesites are standard concrete forma-
tions laid out in equally placed distances from 
each other, each carrying the remains of for-
mer FALINTIL fighters and activists who are 
connected to one another through the sacri-
fice of national liberation, rather than genea-
logical connection or faith (Grenfell 2012, 99). 
While most of the government’s memorial-
isation activities have been confined to the nation’s 
capital (or nearby areas such as Metinaro), recent 
initiatives suggest an increasing reach into the 
rural areas. Particularly prominent are the osuario 
(ossuaries) that are being constructed in each 
district alongside a series of uniform, abstract, 
monuments to commemorate the three ‘fronts’ of 
the resistance.6 The ossuaries, which are identical 
in design, and painted in garish pink, purple and 
white, are intended to hold the remains of those 
killed by the Indonesian military in that district 
during the 24-year occupation. The eventual aim 
is to conduct official state burials of the dead in 
the grounds outside the ossuaries. Families of the 
dead are thus being encouraged to either collect the 
remains of their dead (where locations are known) 
or, in cases where private burials have already 
taken place, exhume remains and inter them to the 
ossuary. In cases where bodies are not able to be 
recovered, some families have substituted rocks, 
tais (woven cloth) or photos for bodies, which are 
placed in empty coffins. 
In connection with the newly constructed 
ossuaries, officially sponsored commemorations 
are increasingly being held outside of Dili. For 
instance, the 2014 commemorations of the 6 April 
Liquica church massacre were held in tandem with 
a state-funded process to collect the remains of 
those killed by the Indonesian military and inter 
them in the ossuary. The process was initiated by a 
group of local veterans who organised themselves 
into the Komisaun Hodi Rekoilla Restus Mortais 
(Commission to Recover the Remains of the Dead) 
and applied to the state secretary for veterans affairs 
for funding. These funds were used to organise 
a ceremony at the ossuary of the 6 April, and to 
provide coffins (and RDTL7 flags and black tais to 
Nicolau Lobato statue, Dili. Humans of Dili 
Community facebook page. <www.facebook.com/
humansofdili>, posted 8 June, 2014.
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drape over them) to family members. The ceremony 
consisted of a procession of family members carrying 
coffins, who marched from the Liquica church to 
the ossuary, where the prime minister, the chief 
of Cabinet, and the secretary of state for veterans 
affairs, delivered speeches to honour Liquica’s heroes.
Another state-sponsored commemorative cere-
mony was held in Kraras, Viqueque district, in 2013. 
Kraras is the well-known site of a series of massacres 
in 1983 of up to 300 civilians that had taken place 
in retaliation for FRETILIN8 attacks on an Indone-
sian military post (CAVR 2005, Part 3 and Part 7.7). 
Rather than taking place on the anniversaries of the 
actual massacres in September 1983 the commemo-
ration was timed to coincide with Timor-Leste’s 
‘Restoration of Independence’ day on 28 November, 
thus linking this local massacre to the nation’s story. 
The ceremony included speeches by Timor-Leste’s 
president and prime minister, a performance by an 
Indonesian singing group, and a fireworks display. 
Imagining the Nation 
These rituals of commemoration and reburial dem-
onstrate how the state is self-consciously seeking to 
draw personal experiences of death and grief into 
a national imaginary. Deaths that were previously 
mourned by families through private rituals are 
being appropriated into national rituals, and reinter-
preted as part of a collective, national story. 
It is arguable that in Timor-Leste, memorial 
projects might be a particularly powerful means 
of fostering a sense of national consciousness. In 
contrast to Benedict Anderson’s classic account of 
modern nation formation, which highlights the sig-
nificance of print capitalism, literature and literacy 
in enabling the ‘fictional unity of the nation-state 
to take root in the minds of the people as a given 
reality’ (Kwon 2006, 104), it may be that in Timor-
Leste, ritual will play a more important role than 
literature in this regard. There are a range of rea-
sons for this, including the primacy of oral forms 
of transmission of knowledge and the significance 
of ritual within East Timorese society generally, 
as well as more prosaic factors such as continuing 
low levels of literacy and the sheer lack of access to 
the written word amongst rural populations (Kwon 
2006, 104).9 The extent of community involvement 
in these rituals — in Liquica, 271 bodies were col-
lected and interred in the ossuary during the 2014 
ceremony — suggests the growing reach of this pro-
ject.10 The role played by prominent local individu-
als (for instance, in forming committees, seeking 
government funding and organising ceremonies) 
also indicates that they should not be simply char-
acterised as ‘state-driven’, and that a range of other 
actors assert their agency in this process.
By the same token, it is also worth reflecting on 
the extent to which people’s willingness to partici-
Santa Cruz monument, Dili. Photo: Lia Kent. 
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pate in the performance of state-sponsored com-
memoration rituals is necessarily increasing their 
connection to, and faith in, the state. As Damian 
Grenfell (2009, 190–91) writes, state-building in 
Timor-Leste — in the sense of the development of 
practices and processes of governance through cen-
tralised institutional forms — has lagged far behind 
the development of a sense of national conscious-
ness. For much of the 80 per cent of the popula-
tion who live in rural areas and rely on subsistence 
agriculture, kinship-based ties and structures retain 
a primary function in the organisation of social 
and political relationships, and the state remains 
a remote presence (Brown 2013; Grenfell 2009). 
State institutions, observes Anne Brown, ‘have little 
reach beyond the capital, and there remains a deep 
disconnection between urban and rural life’ (Brown 
2013, 20). Moreover, the institutions of state that 
have been created have ‘little or any reference to the 
systems of social order or value actually in opera-
tion for the majority of people’ (Brown 2013, 21). 
Where rural regions and communities are included 
in the process of state-building, they are treated 
‘reductively’, as passive recipients of (hoped for) 
services, rather than as active participants in politi-
cal life (Brown 2013, 21). 
Given these constraints, the general attitude of 
most East Timorese towards the state is pragmatic; 
people do not understand themselves to be ‘citizens’ 
in the sense of being equal members of a national 
polity (see Douglas 2000) but, rather, view the 
state as a source of wealth and benefits which can 
be tapped into if the right means are employed 
and the right connections are made (see Jacobsen 
1998; Grenfell 2009, 191). For those who have been 
unable to tap into the state’s largesse, there is a 
pervasive sense of disappointment, one that is often 
expressed as a lament that the po’vu ki’ik (small 
people/ordinary people) who gave their lives for the 
nation’s liberation, have not yet been recompensed 
for their sacrifices (Traube 2007; see also Kent 
2011). While popular participation in state-
sponsored commemorative rituals may be high, 
then, and these rituals may even be fostering a sense 
of national consciousness, this is not necessarily 
strengthening people’s connection to the state and 
its instrumentalised nation-building agenda.
The selective narrative of national identity 
promoted by the political leadership and expressed 
in state-sponsored memory projects also means 
that not all East Timorese can find a place in it. 
While the 24-year resistance struggle arguably 
forms a strong basis for a common East Timorese 
identity, since the nation’s independence there 
has been a progressive narrowing of this narrative 
towards a privileging of the roles and contributions 
Liquica ossuary. Photo: Lia Kent. 
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of the FALINTIL forces. In the process, the 
contributions of other sectors of society to the 
independence struggle are marginalised, among 
them members of the Clandestine resistance — the 
network of civilians based in the towns and villages 
that far outnumbered the FALINTIL forces — and 
women, young people and diaspora East Timorese 
who were not part of formal resistance structures 
yet contributed in informal ways. In the drive to 
construct a ‘heroic’ national identity, there is little 
place for those whose family members died at the 
hands of the East Timorese resistance movement 
and who are considered ‘traitors’ or ‘collaborators.’ 
Nor is there space for recognition of ordinary 
civilians who were not directly involved in the 
resistance struggle and, because of their experiences 
of violence and the ongoing ramifications of these 
experiences in the form of poverty, marginalisation, 
disability or poor health, perceive themselves to be 
the povu ki’ik. 
It is not just that the heroic narrative of national 
identity is depriving these groups and individuals 
of symbolic recognition. For those who can success-
fully claim the status of ‘veteran’ of the resistance 
(according to criteria that favour the armed strug-
gle), there are very tangible material benefits in the 
form of substantial annual veterans’ pensions and 
preferential access to government contracts.11 All of 
this suggests that the heroic narrative is fostering a 
narrow conception of citizenship, one that is based 
around narrow, militarised, male, resistance identity 
(Kent and Kinsella 2014) and is inscribed through 
the state’s allocation of significant public resources 
to former combatants.
Memory Frictions
Despite the increasing encroachment of the state 
into the sphere of memorialisation, political elites 
do not have a monopoly on how the past is remem-
bered. Frictions are evident between different 
actors, discourses and practices. The remainder of 
this paper focuses on the frictions between official 
and local ways of remembering the past; specifical-
ly, it examines what this friction reveals about the 
differences of opinion that exist in relation to which 
events should be remembered and how they should 
be remembered.12 
Local dissatisfaction with official memory dis-
courses and practices is rarely articulated overtly 
in the form of public protests or conflict. It is more 
commonly conveyed in private conversations or 
embodied in subtle forms of disregard for certain 
events or monuments. These expressions of dis-
satisfaction also allude to the existence of a range 
of interrelated tensions. One set of tensions high-
lights the ways in which certain sections of society 
perceive themselves to be excluded from the heroic 
national narrative and seek to address this exclusion 
by engaging in struggles for recognition (see Leach 
2008). A second set of tensions highlights the ambiv-
alence that is felt by some citizens about the ways in 
which local ways of remembering, local identities 
and customary belief systems are perceived as being 
in the process of creating a ‘modern’ nation-state. 
An example of the first kind of tension can be 
seen in the diversity of views expressed about the 
Nicolau Lobato statue. For a key member of the 
12 November Committee and former Clandestine 
leader, the statue is not a good likeness of Lobato 
and is too ‘militaristic’. East Timorese resistance 
Interior of Liquica ossuary. Photo: Lia Kent. 
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leaders such as Lobato ‘gave instructions, they made 
plans, they didn’t carry guns’ he explains. There is, 
therefore, no need to present Lobato carrying a gun 
like an ordinary soldier; he should be portrayed 
speaking to the people, holding a microphone. 
These views, echoed by other former Clandestine 
leaders, are symptomatic of the dissatisfaction that 
is felt about the primacy given to the armed struggle 
over other fronts of the resistance.13
The 2013 commemoration of the Kraras mas-
sacre provides an example of the second kind of ten-
sion, in that it highlights how community members 
have been unhappy with the perceived instrumen-
talisation of local ways of remembering the past for a 
broader nation-building agenda. Prior to 2013, com-
memorations of this massacre had been organised by 
a local Kraras victims group with support from the 
national human rights non-government organisation 
(NGO) Yayasan Hak. Both groups were critical of the 
2014 state-organised commemoration, which, they 
argued, was centrally planned and administered, 
with very little community consultation or involve-
ment (even the food, I was told, was prepared in Dili 
rather than by the local community.) The fact that 
the ceremony focused on acknowledging Kraras’s 
‘heroes’, and ignored the suffering experienced by 
Kraras’s many widows whose husbands were killed 
during the massacres, was also criticised, highighting 
that the first kind of tension was also evident. These 
women, many of whom are ineligible for veterans’ 
pensions because their husbands were not members 
of FALINTIL, have no place in the heroic narrative. 
A similar combination of tensions was evident 
in Liquica where, with the assistance of national 
human rights NGOs, local families have traditional-
ly organised their own commemorations of the Liq-
uica church massacre of 6 April 1999. In 2014, due 
to the involvement of the Komisaun Hodi Rekoilla 
Restus Mortais and national political leaders, this 
commemoration had a different flavour. Families of 
victims of the 6 April massacre usually organise a 
mass in the church followed by a visit to the nearby 
‘Angel’ monument — built by the local community 
to remember those civilians who were killed that 
day — to place flowers and light candles. In 2014, 
those involved in the Komisaun did not invite the 
community to visit the Angel monument; instead, 
following the mass, they led the procession of cof-
fins carrying the dead directly from the church to 
the ossuary. Families of those killed during the 6 
April massacre felt this was disrespectful. 
The monument of the two young men caught up 
in the Santa Cruz demonstrations outside the Mot-
ael Church is another site where both kinds of ten-
sions have been evident. As Michael Leach (2013) 
observes, a key issue is that the monument was only 
established in 2012, despite the fact that the Santa 
Cruz massacre is widely perceived as a hinge point 
in the campaign for independence, a moment when 
the outside world finally became aware of Timor-
Leste’s plight. The delay is significant in that it seems 
to imply the older generation’s lack of regard for 
young people’s contributions to the resistance. The 
lack of government consultation with the 12 Novem-
ber committee — the organisation that represents 
and advocates on behalf of families of victims of 
the massacre — prior to building the monument, is 
perceived as another instance of this disregard and 
disrespect.14 During the 2013 ceremonies to mark 
the anniversary of the massacre, members of the 12 
November committee expressed their dissatisfaction 
about this state of affairs by deliberating bypassing 
the monument. As a consequence, the monument 
has yet to be officially inaugurated. 
The fact that both the young men represented 
in the Santa Cruz monument are still alive has 
been a further source of tension. Neither of the 
men were consulted prior to the monument’s 
construction, and one of the men, who lives in 
the Dili suburb of Becora, has reportedly written 
to Prime Minister Gusmao requesting it to be 
demolished.15 This expression of dissatisfaction, 
while a reflection of the government’s poor 
consultation process, also highlights the extent to 
which deeply held beliefs about, and responsibilities 
to, the dead (and indeed customary belief 
systems and practices more generally) have been 
overlooked in the government’s forward-looking 
and ‘modernising’ project of nation formation (see 
Grenfell 2012; Brown 2013, 4; Bovensiepen 2014).
In Timor-Leste, as in many other kinship-
based societies, maintaining harmonious relations 
between the living and their ancestors depends 
critically on conducting proper burials. Mortuary 
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rituals and their associated beliefs are constantly 
evolving, and should, therefore, not be understood 
as static or ‘traditional’ (Grenfell 2012; Sakti 2013). 
Nonetheless, a number of common features can 
be identified among these practices that, as many 
scholars have noted, remain surprisingly resilient 
in present-day society (see Hohe and Nixon 2003, 
57). A key purpose of these rituals is to ‘separate’ 
the spirit of the dead body from the world of the 
living, and to lead the spirit to rest so that it will 
not torment the living. In cases where ‘unnatural’ or 
violent death (sometimes known as ‘red’ death) has 
occurred, these rituals are even more important as 
without them, it is believed that a person’s klamar 
(spirit) may seek vengeance on the family and the 
whole community, causing death or ongoing con-
flict. In cases where the whereabouts of bodies are 
unknown (a common experience for those whose 
family members died during the conflict), this can 
cause acute anguish. It is believed that in these 
cases, the dead are condemned to wander, unable to 
enter the spirit world (Field 2004, 207–8); Rawns-
ley 2004). While special rituals can sometimes be 
conducted in which a rock taken from the site of 
death is used as a substitute for the body, families 
continue to go to great lengths to try and locate and 
exhume the bodies of their dead.
Catholic belief systems add another impor-
tant dimension to death rituals, and it is usual for 
prayers to be offered, for crosses to be placed on 
gravesites, and for a mass to be conducted in a 
church (Grenfell 2012). It is also common for peo-
ple to visit the gravesites and memorials of the 
dead on significant Catholic holidays such as Loron 
Matebian (All Souls Day) in order to light candles, 
spread flower petals on coffins and offer prayers to 
the dead. A key reason some have expressed unhap-
piness with the Santa Cruz memorial is that they 
interpret it as dangerous according to customary 
beliefs to burn candles before images of people who 
are still alive. This may curse them, causing those 
whose image is represented to sicken and die; in 
effect, it is a process of wishing them dead. The fact 
that political leaders appeared to give little thought 
to these issues as part of the monument planning 
process highlights both the shallow and selective 
nature with which the current political elite treats 
customary belief and practices, as well as the extent 
to which the process of nation formation itself, 
which abstracts communities into a national polity, 
leaves little space for local beliefs and value systems. 
Tensions between the nation-building demands 
of the political elite and customary belief systems 
were also evident during the process to inter the 
remains of the dead in the Liquica ossuary. A key 
issue concerned the request for families to exhume 
the bodies of their dead. For those who had already 
buried their loved ones and had undertaken private, 
familial, rituals in accordance with the demands of 
adat (custom), exhuming those bodies was not a 
straightforward process; complicated rituals were 
required, involving significant financial output, to 
ensure the ancestors are not displeased. 
Maria, for instance, explained how, before 
exhuming the body of her husband, a former mem-
ber of the Clandestine network who was killed by 
militia in 1999, she first consulted her local priest.16 
After being reassured that it was permissible to do 
this, and that it was important for the state to ‘put 
the dead together in one place’, she then consulted 
her family’s Lian Nain (customary leader), also ask-
ing him for permission and requesting information 
about the required rituals. Maria then organised 
two separate rituals — one at her ‘lower’ house 
(house of residence) and the other at her uma 
foho (mountain house/traditional house) — which 
involved the slaughtering of two goats (one to 
allow her to ‘open’ the grave, the other to close it). 
Maria’s extended family participated in the ritual, 
which involved a wake for one night in the house, 
and another night at the uma foho, during which 
prayers to the ancestors (hamulak) were made. 
While Maria was pleased that her husband would 
be dignified by the state, she was disappointed 
that she was not provided with funds to help her 
cover the costs of these expensive rituals. She also 
explained that she still feels todan (heavy) because 
her husband’s remains are no longer close to her 
house and she is unable to visit him regularly.
Nonetheless, the fact that so many families were 
willing to exhume their dead highlights the degree to 
which there is flexibility, pragmatism and innovation 
within local sociocultural belief systems and rituals 
(Sakti 2012, 449).17 It also highlights that the nation, 
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while not replacing local ways of remembering or 
forms of identification, has become a key frame of 
reference through which ordinary people are negoti-
ating the private and political meanings of the past. 
The economic benefits provided through the 
veterans’ valourisation scheme have undoubtedly 
given added impetus to families’ decisions to 
participate in state-sponsored reburial rituals. 
In a context in which many families have yet to 
receive veterans’ payments and there is a backlog 
of some years for the assessment and processing of 
veterans claims, some believe that the recognition 
provided by the state to their dead may give their 
claims added weight.18 Recent discussions within 
the parliament about revising the veteran’s law (and 
restricting the number of pension beneficiaries) 
and presidential statements that the process of 
giving ‘projects’ to veterans will soon stop is further 
incentivising people to benefit from existing 
schemes while they can.19 
Nevertheless, many questions remain about 
the effects of the ossuaries and state-sanctioned 
reburial rituals. In his forward to Kwon’s book on 
commemoration in Vietnam, Drew Faust observes 
that ‘to change the actual location of a body 
through reburial is actually to shift its place in 
understanding, to reinterpret as well as to reinter’ 
(Faust 2006, xii). In the context of Timor-Leste, it 
remains to be seen whether the state-sanctioned 
reburial of bodies in the ossuaries will change the 
meanings given to those bodies. It is possible that 
claiming the dead for the state, reinterpreting them 
as heroes, might remove them from the web of 
special relationships with their communities and 
extended families (see Faust 2006, xii). It seems 
more likely, however, that state-sponsored memory 
practices will not subsume local practices and that 
memory will continue to be distributed across 
many places (Kwon 2006, 152). It is also possible 
that, as Kwon found in Vietnam, state-sponsored 
practices may be a catalyst for the vitalisation of 
local ways of remembering (Kwon 2006, 152) and 
that local engagement in state-sponsored reburials 
may work to subtly broaden the categories of the 
dead who officially count as ‘heroes’.20 To view 
these dynamics through the lens of nation-making, 
it seems that while the idea of the nation may be 
gaining traction through state-sponsored reburials 
and people are seeking the recognition of their dead 
as funu nain, this is not necessarily fostering the 
‘gradual acculturation of people to a set of shared, 
univocal systems’ (Foster 2002, 17). Rather, a more 
fluid, evolving and frictional process is underway 
in which there is considerable tension between 
national and local goals, priorities and practices. 
Alternative Memory Initiatives and 
Interventions 
While East Timorese reactions to state-sponsored 
monuments and rituals reveal a number of subtle 
memory frictions, alternative, civil-society-led, 
memory projects illuminate them in a more overt 
way. These projects, which are co-ordinated by 
a small number of Dili-based intellectuals and 
activists, remain relatively small in scope, and are 
less visible than the well-resourced state-driven 
initiatives. Nonetheless, their emergence shows that 
some efforts are underway to challenge the ways in 
which state-driven commemorative initiatives are 
planned, and to broaden the kinds of events that are 
remembered, and the ways they are remembered. 
A prominent example of an alternative memory 
project can be seen in the work of the 12 Novem-
ber committee. As noted earlier, the committee 
organises its own annual commemorations of the 
Santa Cruz massacre, which deliberately bypass the 
state-constructed monument outside the Motael 
Church. These commemorations generally involve 
a march to the site of the massacre itself, the Santa 
Cruz cemetery, where speeches are made by vari-
ous groups. The committee has also begun its own 
program to ‘animate’ the new generation of Timor-
Leste’s young people through educating them about 
the roles of youth in the struggle for national lib-
eration. As part of this program, they have organ-
ised a series of workshops for young people, both 
in and beyond Dili, which involve the presentation 
of musicals/plays about the 12 November massacre 
followed by discussions. Max Stahl’s famous docu-
mentary about 12 November is also shown. 
The advocacy efforts of members of the 12 
November committee and other civil society 
leaders have led also to a more inclusive planning 
process for the transformation of the Santa Cruz 
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cemetery into a memorial site. This site has 
been a source of tension between civil society 
organisations and the government since the 
decision to initiate a nationwide design competition 
for its reconstruction. After selecting the winning 
entry, the government devised an ambitious plan 
that involved the widening of the road next to 
the cemetery, the shifting of a number of existing 
gravesites to make more space for pathways, and 
the destruction of the cemetery wall. Concerns 
were expressed by some civil society leaders 
about the unrealistic nature of the plan, the lack 
of community involvement, and the degree to 
which families of the dead would resist requests 
to rebury their dead due to the demands of adat. 
There were also concerns that the government’s 
plans would impose a particular, ‘fixed’ meaning 
to the massacre, which would not make space for 
individuals own interpretations of events. 
The government’s plan was eventually aban-
doned and a new steering committee involving 
representatives from the 12 November committee 
has been established to develop an alternative plan 
for the use of the site. The proposed new plan will 
involve spaces for commemoration, civic education, 
a theatre site for use by community groups, and a 
simple, abstract memorial. Space will be made avail-
able for people to write the names of loved ones on 
the wall, and families will be permitted to make daily 
visits to light candles for their dead. Agreement has 
also been reached that the site will be managed by 
the 12 November committee, the historic cemetery 
wall will not be demolished and that, in recognition 
of families’ customary responsibilities to the dead, 
gravesites will not be moved. These developments 
are significant because they show that, while the 
state will attempt to devise monuments that assign 
fixed meanings to past events, there is some scope 
for influencing these plans (at least if powerful indi-
viduals are involved). Although the outcome of the 
committee’s negotiations remains to be seen, it is 
possible that the new plan for the Santa Cruz cem-
etery will allow spaces for private ways of remember-
ing and, by providing venues for popular theatre and 
education, allow for expressions of multiple truths 
and new interpretations of past events. These devel-
opments suggest that national and local forms of 
remembering may not need to be oppositional but 
can coexist, and that there are ongoing processes of 
mutual transformation at work.21 
Other organisations involved in projects to 
remember the past include Yayasan Hak (Rights 
Foundation) and the Association Chega! Ba Ita 
(ACBIT). In contrast to the 12 November activities, 
these projects are explicitly tied in to an advocacy 
agenda that seeks to raise awareness of civilians’ 
experiences of violence during the conflict in order 
to support a campaign for justice and reparations. 
Yayasan Hak, for instance, has recently recruited 
young people around the country to interview their 
family members about their experiences of the con-
flict. These interviews have been produced in a book 
entitled Lian husi pasadu: experiensia povu balu 
iha konflitu Timor-Leste 1975–1999 (Words From 
the Past: The Experiences of Some of the Popula-
tion About the Conflict in Timor-Leste 1975–1999). 
ACBIT has begun a project focused on docu-
menting women’s experiences of violence, includ-
ing sexual violence, during the conflict. Through 
a series of gatherings to enable women to share 
their experiences, the project has produced a book 
about women’s experiences that has been distributed 
throughout Timor. Another documentation program 
initiated by OPMT22 is writing a history of women’s 
contributions to the resistance through a nation-
wide interview process. This project, which can be 
seen as challenging the narrow and gendered way in 
which the ‘hero’ identity is defined in Timor-Leste, 
is explicitly geared towards fostering understandings 
of women’s roles as active participants (rather than 
passive victims) during the conflict. 
These diverse initiatives and interventions by 
local civil society leaders demonstrate the extent 
to which, in Timor-Leste as elsewhere, collective 
memory — and conceptions of national identity — 
is under constant reconstruction, and will evolve as 
new generations invest new meanings in the events 
of the past (see Young 2000). It is also important 
to note that these initiatives do not challenge the 
idea of the ‘nation’ itself. In fact, they often evince 
a high degree of pride in East Timorese history and 
identity, and endorse the centrality of the resistance 
struggle within this. What they implicitly question is 
who gets to define the narrative of national identity, 
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and whose experiences are included and excluded 
within it. 
A positive reading of these initiatives suggests 
that over time, they may help to broaden the kinds 
of publicly acceptable narratives of the occupation, 
potentially leading to more inclusive understand-
ings of national identity. The reach of these pro-
jects, and their contribution to imagining different 
visions of the nation, should, nonetheless, not be 
overestimated. They remain small scale and under-
resourced in comparison to state-sponsored initia-
tives. They also rely on the efforts of a relatively 
small group of well-connected, Dili-based, intel-
lectuals, and are often linked to particular advocacy 
agendas, suggesting that they should not necessarily 
be understood as ‘popular’ expressions of memory. 
Conclusion
The East Timorese government’s use of memori-
als and commemorative rituals to foster national 
consciousness is increasingly visible. Because these 
rituals and monuments tap into the desires of ordi-
nary people for recognition of their dead as funu 
nain there is, generally speaking, widespread sup-
port for them. Given that the state has significantly 
more resources at its disposal for memorialisation 
than other groups, and that, for those who can 
claim recognition as a war hero, there are economic 
benefits at stake in the form of access to veterans’ 
pensions, we are likely to see more support for 
these kinds of projects. It is possible that this may 
lead to a further narrowing and ‘fixing’ of the ways 
in which the past can be publicly remembered, 
the continued exclusion of those who are unable 
to claim a place within the heroic national narra-
tive, and a marginalisation of diverse, local, ways of 
remembering. 
Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that local ways of 
remembering are being swept aside in the process 
of modern nation formation. Just because the state 
is increasingly exerting ownership over the (heroic) 
dead does not mean that people are not remember-
ing them in other ways or engaging in state-spon-
sored rituals to meet their own needs. Moreover, 
given that both state-sponsored and local ways of 
remembering the past are constantly negotiated, 
each is likely to reshape the other to some extent 
(although of course, there are significant power 
imbalances). As the recent debate over the use of 
the Santa Cruz cemetery site suggests, it is possible 
that with some encouragement from local memory 
civil society leaders, state-driven memorialisation 
projects might become more consultative, rather 
than treating the population as mere ‘recipients’ 
of those projects. They might also become more 
attuned to customary belief systems and more 
receptive to multiple narratives about the past. It is 
also possible that local engagement in state-spon-
sored memorialisation will subtly work against the 
state’s efforts to ‘consolidate and contain’ the mean-
ing of sacrifice (see Truitt 2008, 260) and delineate 
those whose lives count in the national narrative. 
The fact that local civil society leaders are lead-
ing alternative story-telling and memorialisation 
initiatives provides further evidence that the state 
does not have a monopoly on remembering the 
past and imagining the nation. These initiatives 
call attention to the paradox of state-sponsored 
memorialisation; while the political elite may seek 
to construct an ‘official’ version of the past, the very 
attempt to shape understandings of the Indonesian 
occupation (and promote selective ‘forgetting’) may 
be prompting alternative memory practices. The 
friction that is evident as civil society groups and 
ordinary people negotiate,and seek to expand the 
ways in which the past is remembered should not 
be viewed in negative light, as an impediment to the 
building of cohesion. Rather, it should be under-
stood as part of the contested, uneven and shifting 
process of nation-making by groups and individuals 
with varying degrees of power and influence. While 
the trajectory of this process is by no means certain, 
it is possible that, over time, it may help to create 
space for the recognition of those who have been 
historically marginalised in the imaginings of the 
nation and for a greater acknowledgement of local 
and customary ways of remembering. What seems 
clear is that close attention to locally grounded and 
civil-society-led memory practices might provide 
important insights into how the nation is experi-
enced, imagined and contested by a diversity of 
Timor-Leste’s citizens.
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Endnotes
1 The analysis in this paper draws on observations 
made during fieldwork in Timor-Leste in July 2014 
and July 2011. The author would like to thank 
Sinclair Dinnen, Sue Ingram, Damian Grenfell, 
Amy Rothschild and Nuno Rodriguez Tchailoro for 
valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.
2 The friction metaphor was introduced by Anna 
Tsing (2005) to describe the ways in which universal 
concepts, such as human rights, justice, democracy, 
and capitalism ‘travel’ and are charged and changed 
within particular locations (see also Shaw 2007, 18; 
Bjorkdahl and Hoglund 2013, 292). While the concept 
of friction is often used to explore how international 
concepts play out in local contexts, in this paper I 
use to explore how different actors, concepts and 
narratives within a particular society can also ‘rub up 
against’ each other and, in the process, generate new 
power relations, ideas and practices.
3 See, for instance, Katherine Verdery’s fascinating 
study of Eastern Europe following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. She shows how state-sanctioned 
practices of reburying revolutionary leaders, 
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heroes, artists and other luminaries have served to 
‘collectivise and nationalise dead bodies hitherto 
mourned by families as their individual dead’ 
(Verdery 1999, 101). These practices, she suggests, 
have been an integral part of forming new Serbian, 
Croatian and Bosnian states. 
4 The church is significant in the story of the Santa 
Cruz massacre as, in the weeks leading up to it, 
young activists, in preparation for a visit from the 
Portuguese parliament, painted banners protesting 
the Indonesian occupation in the church grounds. 
An altercation with the Indonesian military took 
place on 28 October, during which a young East 
Timorese, Sebastião Gomes, was shot and killed. The 
Clandestine movement organised a funeral service at 
Motael Church on the morning of 12 November, after 
which a march took place to the Santa Cruz cemetery 
as part of a demonstration to commemorate Gomes’ 
death (see CAVR 2005, Part 3).
5    Portuguese: Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional 
de Timor-Leste;  English: Armed Forces for the 
National Liberation of East Timor.
6 The East Timorese resistance movement is commonly 
described as having been organised into three 
‘fronts’: an Armed front, a Clandestine front, and a 
Diplomatic front. 
7 Portuguese: República Democrática de Timor Leste; 
English: Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste.
8 Portuguese: Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste 
Independent; English: Revolutionary Front for an 
Independent East Timor.
9 See Kwon (2006), who observes this phenomenon in 
Vietnam.
10 Similar processes are underway in other districts. 
See for instance media reports about Ainaro (Restus 
Mortais Ainaro Tau iha Osuarioj Resin Ona/ Many 
remains have been placed in the Ainaro Ossuary 
already, Suara Timor-Lorosae, 25/6/2014, and the 
village of Quelacai where a local ‘intellectual’ has 
formed a ‘committee eventual’ to recover the bones of 
resistance members and FALINTIL in that area. The 
community meeting to discuss this involved almost 
200 people (Atu Halo’ot Restu Mortais: Intelektual 
Hari’i Komisaun Eventual/Intellectual creates a 
commission, Timor Post 23/6/2014).
11  See the Statute of the National Liberation Combatants 
(2006). 
12 This is not to suggest that there are not diverse 
views held by different members of the political 
elite about what constitutes the official narrative 
of the past. The growing focus of the armed front 
within memorialisation initiatives, for instance, 
reaffirms Xanana Gusmao’s legitimacy vis a vis that 
of FRETILIN’s, and asserts his ownership of the 
narrative of the resistance. An examination of these 
tensions is however beyond the scope of this paper.
13 Nonetheless, some of those with a vested interest 
in the militarised, masculine, narrative have also 
expressed dissatisfaction with the statue. Complaints 
are heard, for instance, that Lobato is depicted 
holding his gun in the manner of a civilian rather 
than a combatant (suggesting that the statue is 
perceived not to be militaristic enough). 
14 The decision to construct the monument was 
apparently made unilaterally by Xanana Gusmao 
because he liked the image.
15 Interview with civil society leader, Dili, 16 June.
16  Interviews in Liquica, 26–27 June 2014.
17 Questions remain about whether the process will be 
as straightforward in other districts. For instance, 
I was told that in Los Palos, it is very difficult 
to exhume the dead because of the strength of 
customary belief systems.
18 Interview with ‘Lucia’, Liquica, 27/6/2014.
19 Interview with civil society leader, Dili, 17/6/2014. 
20 For instance, I was told by some Liquica residents 
that not all of the bodies interred in the ossuary were 
the bodies of former resistance members killed by 
the Indonesian military or East Timorese militia and 
that some had died from ‘natural’ causes, including 
famine. 
21 See Grenfell (2012, 104), who makes this argument 
with reference to the Maupitine monument.
22  Portuguese: Organizacao Popular de Mulher Timor; 
English: Popular Organisation of East Timorese 
Women.
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